Robert Walker's Research

Political Instability and Exchange Rate Regimes: The Intervening Role of Domestic Political Institutions

Slides: Political Instability and Exchange Rate Regimes [TeXpower]

This paper explores the logical underpinnings of the oft-reported relationship between political instability and the propensity for less rigid nominal exchange rate regimes. In short, I argue that competitive reselection in democratic societies is responsible for this relationship, while nondemocracies are likely to adopt more rigid exchange rate regimes as political instability increases. Using a sample from the developing world, I find significant evidence in support of this view and then apply the insights to the vanishing intermediate exchange rate or two poles hypothesis. In effect, democratization and a greater number of democratic societies make intermediate regimes more rather than less likely.

With and Without Drawers?

I reevaluate Gelpi and Griesdorf's 2001 APSR article and the literature linking war and conflict outcomes with more realistic depictions of the relationship between external conflict and the probability of remaining in office. After reasoning that losing is far more important than winning -- despite the emphasis in the literature. Empirical results reflect this claim and cast doubt on Gelpi and Griesdorf's results and interpretation.

Statistical Backwards Induction: A Simple Method for Estimating Recursive Strategic Models (Political Analysis) [or a prior version from here]

We present a simple method for estimating regressions based on recursive extensive-form games. Our procedure, which can be implemented in most standard statistical packages, involves sequentially estimating standard logits (or probits) in a manner analogous to backwards induction. We demonstrate that the technique produces consistent parameter estimates and show how to calculate consistent standard errors. To illustrate the method, we replicate Leblang's (2003) study of speculative attacks by financial markets and government responses to these attacks.

The 2002 Methods meetings version was: Picking a Fight: Disputes, Deterrence, and War-Time Alliances (w/ C. S. Signorino and M. A. Bas)

We specify and test a game theoretic model of triadic interstate conflict. Scholars of international conflict have elaborated a number of explanations for interstate dispute escalation, reciprocation, and diffusion, but have yet to consider these explanations in an interrelated fashion. We assess the impacts of issues, nuclear and conventional military capabilities, similarity of interests, and domestic political regimes on the decisions to escalate, reciprocate, and join a militarized interstate dispute using an iterated version of Signorino's statistical models for extensive form games. The results suggest that potential joiners are of critical importance in understanding the escalation and reciprocation of interstate disputes.

Modelling Crisis in Latin America: A Bayesian Model of Measurement Incorporating Hierarchical Relations (w/ R. W. Stone)

We study early warning models of financial crises using monthly data from Latin America. Adopting a heterogeneous view of crises requires a model for diverse measures, while contagion necessitates a hierarchical structure. This work remains in progress.

International Human Rights: A Quantitative Assessment

I have built a special page to house this ongoing project. There are currently four papers associated with this project.

Investigating the Microfoundations of Long Memory Aggregates

I employ Monte Carlo techniques to investigate the microfoundations of long-memory time series. Strong theory links micro-behavior and aggregations, yet no systematic investigation of these results in econometric theory has taken place. I simulate large populations under a host of differing conditions to investigate the relationship between dynamic heterogeneity and long-memory.

The Nazi-Soviet Pact, the Aumann Conjecture, and Communicating the Value of Outside Options

This research grew out of my honors thesis at the University of Texas on the Molotov-Ribbentropp Pact of 1939. Most archival evidence suggests that the Soviets were strongly committed to concluding a pact with the Allies that never materialized. In fact, there is evidence that Soviet negotiators attempted to communicate Nazi contacts to the Allies to expedite the conclusion of an agreement. However, relying on insights from bargaining theory and costless communication, I demonstrate the lack of credibility that accompanied the Soviet revelations and explain why there may have been little the Soviets could do to insure a joint response to German aggression. In the end, models of bargaining with outside options and cheap talk about these options results in no communication in equilibrium.

Folk Theorems and Cheap Talk Games: Binary Action Spillovers and the Might of the Pen

Cheap talk is extremely problematic when applied to international conflict games. Baliga and Morris isolate the key proposition regarding communication, this paper explains why mechanisms for overcoming this problem are severe. Further, diplomacy can be explained without recourse to high politics.

Bond Risk Project [with Skip Krueger]

Paper: Political Turnover and Bond Risk in the U. S. States

Slides: Imperfect Information, Monitoring Costs, and State Debt Ratings

An enacting government coalition issuing debt cannot make a credible commitment to maintain the existing debt repayment policy. Investors look to recent political turnover to estimate the possibility that some future government coalition will remain substantially similar to the enacting coalition. We test this in a model of state bond ratings from 1995 through 2000 for over 40 states and find that political turnover and divided government increase the default risk of state bonds.

Previously Published Research

You Must Remember This: Dealing with Long Memory in Political Analyses

This paper contributes to the analysis of long-memory time series in political science. In particular, after discussing the underlying issues in generating fractional integration, we investigate techniques for the analysis of fractionally integrated political time series. In particular, we demonstrate an increased probability of spurious relationships with I(d) variables and further demonstrate the strong likelihood that many commonly used political time series are fractionally-integrated. Our simulation results suggest the value of ARFIMA and fractionally-differenced regression based time series models.